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STATE PUNISHMENT AND MEANING IN LIFE
Youngjae Lee
Despite popular beliefs about what philosophers do for a living, it is
not common for philosophers to opine on the meaning of life. It is even
less common to see discussions of the meaning of life in works addressing
the philosophy of punishment. Leo Zaibert’s Rethinking Punishment is
unique for this reason.1 The book displays an unabashed enthusiasm for
the question about the meaning in life and shows us why the question
matters for criminal law theory.
A central focus of Rethinking Punishment is, as Zaibert puts it, “the
problem of meaningful existence.”2 One may ask, what does “the problem
of meaningful existence” have to do with criminal law and the institution
of punishment? Before answering that question, we should be clear that
the question posed here about the relationship between state punishment
and meaning in life is my question, not Zaibert’s. Zaibert is explicit at the
beginning of the book that his primary interest lies in what he calls the
“theoretical” question of punishment, as opposed to the “practical”
question of punishment.3 And by “practical” questions, Zaibert is
referring to the various contemporary issues arising from the state’s use
of its power to criminalize and punish, such as overcriminalization and
overpunishment.4 It is not that Zaibert is not interested in the problem
of state punishment. And he expresses his hope that “the examination of
the theoretical problems surrounding punishment may in fact help us
better understand—and eventually even help us solve—some of those
practical problems that have hitherto monopolized attention.” 5
Nonetheless, such “practical” problems are secondary for Zaibert, as his
primary interest lies in the “theoretical” problem.6



Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See LEO ZAIBERT, RETHINKING PUNISHMENT (2017).
2. Id. at 9.
3. Id. at 1–2.
4. Id.; see also DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 4–5 (2008).
5. ZAIBERT, supra note 1, at 2–3.
6. Id. at 2.
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How does, then, Zaibert consider the theoretical problem of
punishment by focusing on the “the problem of meaningful existence”? 7
A key thought experiment for Zaibert comes from W.D. Ross’s The Right
and the Good:
If we compare two imaginary states of the universe, alike in the
total amounts of virtue and vice and of pleasure and pain present
in the two, but in one of which the virtuous were all happy and
the vicious miserable, while in the other the virtuous were
miserable and the vicious happy, very few people would hesitate
to say that the first was a much better state of the universe than
the second.8
The puzzle in this hypothetical is that the two worlds are identical in
terms of the amount of misery and happiness, but one appears to be a
better world than the other because of the ways in which misery and
happiness are distributed. The question is what exactly makes the
difference. According to Zaibert, the reason one world is better than the
other is desert. “[D]esert,” Zaibert argues, “gives a certain order—a
certain meaning—to the whole in which it appears.”9 How does desert do
that? Zaibert explains that desert “convey[s] meaning to a given situation
and to our lives in general”10 by “providing plots to the world and to our
lives.”11
All of this remains somewhat abstract, and here is a concrete
example that may help illustrate Zaibert’s view that desert gives
meaning to our lives. Amber Rose Carlson, who was raped repeatedly as
a teenager, has written about her feelings about the perpetrator.12 In the
piece, she recounts a question that her therapist once raised: “Imagine
your rapist had been found guilty and sentenced in court. What would
you want his sentence to be?”13 Carlson’s answer to the question was that
“[a]nything less than a death or natural life sentence [would be]
inadequate.”14 When her therapist then asks her, “What if . . . your rapist

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See id. at 9 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 38–39 (quoting W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 138 (1930)).
Id. at 43.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 44.
Amber Rose Carlson, Is There a “Rational” Punishment for My Rapist?, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/opinion/rape-punishmentrational.html.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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had been sentenced to death, but then had been pardoned?”15 Carlson’s
answer is as follows:
I did not have to mull this question over. I knew I would feel
exactly as I do now, exactly as I have felt for the past two decades:
that the world is a terribly unjust place. It is a place where my
life can be irrevocably transformed because a man could exert
control, manipulation and violence over me for years without
repercussion. It is a place where my rapist and others like him
are enabled at both societal and local levels. . . .
A hypothetical pardon would allow him to escape repercussions
just as he has escaped them in reality. Nearly 20 years later as I
began trauma therapy again, he has a secure job, an
accomplished and beautiful wife, and a healthy daughter. He is
living a life many dream of, while my life is disrupted as I
continue to heal from the wounds he inflicted when I was a
child.16
Carlson’s response is striking for our purposes. Instead of saying that
she would be angry or disappointed or upset, she says that she would feel
that “the world is a terribly unjust place.”17 When Zaibert says that
desert “conveys meaning” to our lives, it seems that this is the sort of
emotional and cognitive state that he is referring to.18
Here is another illustration, from a movie called While We’re Young.19
The movie is about a friendship between two documentary filmmakers,
Josh, who is in his forties, and Jamie, who is in his twenties. Josh is an
idealist (“such a purist” as one character describes him), who once made
a film called Power Elite.20 Josh is devoted to documentary filmmaking
as a form and takes extremely seriously his obligation as a documentary
filmmaker to tell the unvarnished, authentic truth about his subject
matter. Josh has been working for nearly ten years on a project on “the
distinctly American relationship between biography and history, theory
and method and how that relates to power and class in our country,
particularly the political, military and economic elite.”21 Josh has trouble
finishing the project, however, not only because of the complexity of the
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
ZAIBERT, supra note 1, at 43.
WHILE WE’RE YOUNG (IAC Films 2014).
Id.
Id.
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story he is trying to tell, the high bar he has apparently set for himself
and no doubt other personal hang-ups, but also because he does not
always have the funding to finance the project. At one point in the movie,
he tries to get a wealthy money manager (introduced in the movie simply
as a “hedge fund” person) to invest in his movie but the attempt does not
go anywhere because Josh’s description of the project, apparently, bores
the hedge fund manager.22
Jamie is also a documentary filmmaker, though, unlike Josh, who is
mid-career, Jamie is just getting started. Jamie seeks out Josh, and Josh
begins to mentor Jamie. As their friendship and mentoring relationship
develop, Jamie shares with Josh an idea he has for a documentary
project, where Jamie would open a Facebook account and make a
documentary about meeting and talking to whichever old acquaintance
from his past contacts him first. Josh is initially skeptical about the idea
but encourages it. Jamie’s project grows and eventually turns into a film.
To Josh’s surprise, Jamie seems to have lucked into a fascinating story
of Kent, a military veteran whom Jamie had apparently known in high
school. The documentary is a big hit. As Jamie shows the work in
progress to his friends and acquaintances, he attracts an investor—the
same hedge fund manager whom Josh unsuccessfully tried to court—and
a charismatic mentor, Leslie, a legendary documentary filmmaker who
is revered in the field and also happens to be Josh’s father-in-law. 23
But here’s the thing about Jamie’s movie: it is fraudulent. The
Facebook setup was fake. Kent did not go to high school with Jamie. Kent
is an old friend of Jamie’s wife. Jamie, who had learned about Kent
through his wife, had already known that Kent would be a good subject
for a documentary but decided to frame it as a chance encounter to make
it more dramatic and interesting. When Josh learns about all this, he is
furious and offended and decides to expose Jamie as a fraud, a fake
documentarian who engages in lies that go against everything that the
form stands for. Josh finds Jamie at an event to honor Leslie’s career in
documentary filmmaking, where Leslie had just given a speech about
truth, objectivity, and authenticity. This is the perfect opportunity for
Josh to expose Jamie for the fraud he is. Josh breathlessly explains to his
onlookers—Leslie, the hedge fund investor, and his film producer wife—
that Jamie’s documentary is full of lies, that things did not happen the
way the documentary says they did, and that, by implication, Jamie is
not fit to be a true documentary filmmaker. Surely everyone would now
see the truth about Jamie!24
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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To his crushing disappointment, the reaction is not what he expects.
The hedge fund investor could not care less. His own wife does not seem
as bothered. And, most disturbingly, Leslie, the guru in the group
everyone worships, responds as captured in the following exchange:
LESLIE: Is what Josh is saying true?
JAMIE: Well . . . I did know, but I don’t think it really matters
though, the movie’s not about that.
JOSH: Of course it matters. Leslie, explain . . .
LESLIE: I don’t know that it totally matters in this case.
JOSH: What?
....
JOSH: . . . Leslie, are you kidding me? You don’t care? You just
gave a speech about authenticity!
LESLIE: . . . [T]he movie works on so many levels, the
happenstance of it, to be honest with you, is the least interesting
part.
JOSH: I can’t believe it! . . . . He’s a con artist. Leslie, your
generation of sit-ins and protesters and pack rats would be
horrified by this demon!25
And when it finally dawns on Josh that he is “going to get no
satisfaction” and that Jamie is “going to win no matter what,” Josh
blankly blurts out: “This is not how the world works.”26
Now, it is not clear at this point in the movie whether one should root
for Josh. There are things about the character that are cringe-worthy,
and he is certainly not flawless. His documentary may not be any good,
either, and Leslie’s assessment at one point that it is “a six-and-a-half
hour film that feels like it’s seven hours too long”27 may well be correct.
But for our purposes, the important sentiment is the one that Josh
expresses: “This is not how the world works.” 28 Or, as Zaibert puts it, “a
world in which vice was commonly rewarded and virtue commonly
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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punished would be problematic . . . because this state of affairs would
strike us as existentially meaningless,”29 and, on the contrary,
“distributions according to merit suffuse the world with meaning.”30
All of this is recognizable. The question is what it has to do with law.
As a general matter, the state is not in the business of ensuring just
deserts. Bad things may happen to good people, just as some people may
achieve far more success than they deserve. But it is not the state’s job to
intervene and take from those who have more than they deserve and give
to those who have less than they deserve. So, we will need something
more than just the idea of desert to give an account of state punishment.
To answer that question, consider a couple more illustrations. The
Untouchables,31 a film based on historical events and characters but
mostly fictional,32 takes place during the Prohibition Era and is about
Eliot Ness, a Bureau of Prohibition agent who leads a small team of
agents to go after Al Capone’s bootlegging operation. Ness’ team starts to
achieve some success against Capone’s organization, which responds by
assassinating members of Ness’ team one by one. The man who carries
out these killings of these agents is Frank Nitti. After Nitti kills one of
Ness’ closest associates, James Malone, an Irish-American officer, Ness
confronts Nitti on a rooftop and corners him. Nitti attempts to escape by
climbing down a rope from the rooftop, and Ness, still very much upset
from Malone’s death, realizes that he could shoot him right there and kill
him as Nitti hangs from the side of the building. After hesitating for a
bit, Ness uncocks his gun and puts it away. Nitti, seeing that Ness would
not kill him, climbs back up to the rooftop and starts taunting, which
begins the following exchange:
NITTI: Come on! Arrest me! What are you waiting for? Don’t just
stand there. Arrest me!
NESS: Don’t push me. They’re going to burn you, buddy.
NITTI: Yeah?
NESS: Yeah, I’m going to come see you burn, you son of a bitch,
because you killed my friend!

29. ZAIBERT, supra note 1, at 9.
30. Id. at 10.
31. THE UNTOUCHABLES (Paramount Pictures 1987).
32. MAX ALLAN COLLINS & A. BRAD SCHWARTZ, SCARFACE AND THE UNTOUCHABLE:
AL CAPONE, ELIOT NESS, AND THE BATTLE FOR CHICAGO, at xv (2018).
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NITTI: He died like a pig.
NESS: What did you say?
NITTI: I said that your friend died screaming like a stuck Irish
pig. Now, you think about that when I beat the rap. 33
Ness, at that point, seems to snap. As Nitti starts to walk away with
his back turned to Ness, Ness approaches him, puts his hands on Nitti’s
shoulder, pushes him towards the edge of the rooftop and off the building.
Nitti falls screaming to his death, landing on a car. 34
Here, Ness goes through two psychological transformations. First,
when he first has an opportunity to kill Nitti, he goes from a private
individual who is facing a person who has killed his closest colleague to
a public official who will arrest Nitti and send him through the legal
process. When Nitti then mocks Malone’s death and his Irish heritage,
Ness is angered and immediately goes through another transformation,
from a public official back to a private individual who avenges his friend’s
death through an act of shocking violence.
Contrast this scene against a scene in the movie Minority Report.35
John Anderton is a cop who has lost his son Sean, presumably to a
kidnapper, six years ago. One day, Anderton, while following an
investigatory lead, stumbles into the empty apartment apparently
belonging to a man who has pictures of several children, including that
of Sean, strewn throughout the apartment. Once he sees the picture,
Anderton is convinced that the person living in that apartment, whose
name is Crow, is a criminal who kidnaps children and is responsible for
his own son’s disappearance. Anderton then says to himself:
Every day for the last six years I’ve thought about only two
things. The first was what my son would look like if he were alive
today. If I would even recognize him if I saw him on the street.
The second was what I would do to the man who took him . . . . I
am going to kill this man.36
Crow comes into the apartment at that point, and Anderton grabs
him and starts beating him up and trying to extract information about
Sean’s whereabouts. Crow tells Anderton that he killed Sean, and
33.
34.
35.
2002).
36.

THE UNTOUCHABLES, supra note 31.
Id
MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox, DreamWorks, & Amblin Entertainment
Id.
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Anderton, overcome with grief and anger, resumes his beating of Crow
and pulls out his gun and points it at Crow. Anderton appears to be about
to kill Crow, but with remarkable self-restraint, he refrains from pulling
the trigger and starts reciting the Miranda rights to Crow instead,
thereby initiating the process of arresting Crow.37
Ness and Anderton both are public officials who consider engaging in
acts of personal vengeance. One of them gives in to the temptation; the
other one does not. Both of them appear to feel the pull of a powerful
justificatory reason to kill, but that does not mean things happen the way
they are supposed to happen between Ness and Nitti, whereas it appears
that Anderton behaves appropriately towards Crow, at least up to this
point. One of the reasons Ness himself hesitates at first is because the
right thing to do in that situation is for him to arrest him and prosecute
him properly through the legal system, and Anderton successfully
suppresses the desire for vengeance and lets the legal process take over.
All of this is happening and is comprehensible to us because these
two characters are working in the context of a particular institutional
setup that we may call the criminal justice system. The scenes resonate
with us because they touch on a fundamental tension present in the
system. As the exclusive agent of punishment, and because citizens are
generally prohibited from retaliating against wrongdoers, the state has
an obligation to respond adequately to wrongdoing by condemning it as
such. The state cannot preserve its legitimacy as the sole rightful holder
of the power to punish unless it proves itself to be an adequate substitute
for what it displaces. It seems to follow that for the state to justify its
possession and exercise of its enormous power to criminalize and punish,
the state should give the people results that approximate what the people
on their own would have produced. Otherwise, individuals would be
tempted to respond to acts of wrongdoing on their own, the way Ness did
and the way Anderton almost did.
However, given the enormous amount of harm that the state can
bring about in people’s lives through its coercive and judgmental uses of
its power to criminalize and punish, the observation that the state is
merely giving people what they want or satisfying the people’s thirst for
revenge by itself cannot serve as a justification for the institutional setup.
What we need is an additional step of justifying the people’s demand for
punishment in the first place. Without such a justificatory step, the
government’s use of power becomes merely a version of keeping the
people satisfied, no matter how immoral their demands may be.

37.

Id.
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What would such a justificatory step look like? It seems to me that it
could look a lot like Zaibert’s argument about desert and meaning in life.
The state can keep its power to punish people and maintain its authority
by keeping the people’s demand for punishment reasonably satisfied.
And when it does so, the state is not just giving into pressure of an
irrational mob to satisfy their thirst for vengeance. When the state seeks
to provide adequate responses to acts of wrongdoing, it rather is giving
wrongdoers what they deserve. And why is it good to give the wrongdoers
what they deserve? Zaibert’s answer, as we saw above, is that “desert
gives a certain order—a certain meaning—to the whole in which it
appears.”38
So, if it turns out to be the case that Ness’ treatment of Nitti is
morally unjustified aside from its vigilante justice aspect, then the legal
system that condemns and stigmatizes Nitti may be unjustified, too.
Similarly, if Anderton is not morally justified to kill Crow himself, then
to the extent whatever awaits Crow when he is brought to the legal
system resembles Anderton’s treatment of Crow, then the legal system
cannot be justified, either. Such a close relationship between state
punishment and private retaliation is affirmed by Zaibert when he says
that even though there are “excellent, typically overriding reasons to
prevent vigilantism, . . . this is not because what a vigilante does is
completely valueless—particularly if it is very similar to what an
authority would have done.”39 In a previous book, Zaibert has similarly
argued that “a perfectly virtuous vigilante . . . is surely conceivable,”40
and that “it is extremely difficult to distinguish sharply between
punishment and revenge”41 under his account, which he has touted as a
point in favor of his account.42
Therefore, even though Zaibert announces at the beginning of his
book that he is mainly interested in theoretical problems of punishment
generally and not in the problem of state punishment, it turns out that
his argument provides an important component of a case for state
punishment. Without an argument like Zaibert’s, we can end up with a
theoretical justification for the institution of punishment that is hollow
at its core. State punishment may be justified as a way to replace the
system of private vengeance, but if whatever state punishment is
replacing is morally unjustified, then to the extent that the state
produces outcomes that resemble those that would be arrived at under
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See ZAIBERT, supra note 1, at 43.
Id. at 48–49.
LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 185 (2016).
Id. at 69.
Id. at 95.
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the system of private vengeance, then state punishment cannot be
morally justified, either. All of Zaibert’s talk about meaning in life, then,
is important because those who seek to justify the institution of
punishment may need an account like Zaibert’s to offer a complete
defense of the system, and this is the way in which Zaibert’s book
demonstrates why the question of meaning may matter for criminal law
theorists. It seems to me that this is an important theoretical
contribution of Zaibert’s book.
However, I would like to end this comment with a cautionary note. If
it is indeed the case that state punishment exists as a way of displacing
the system of private vengeance, we should think about the ways in
which the legal system is supposed to be an improvement over the system
it replaces. The standard story is that the legal system is superior
because of its ability to investigate the factual basis for claims of
wrongdoing thoroughly and accurately; its provision of basic procedural
safeguards for the accused, such as those found in the Bill of Rights; and
proportionality limitations on amounts of punishment. I would like to
focus on the aspect that is of central importance to Zaibert’s theory:
suffering.
Zaibert emphasizes the significance of suffering throughout the book.
He says, for instance, that there is an “essential conceptual connection
between punishment and suffering.”43 He elaborates that “[w]hatever
specific punishments turn out to be, to the extent that they remain forms
of punishment, they will necessarily have to (seek to) make the
wrongdoer suffer.”44 He also says that “[t]o punish . . . is to (try to) inflict
suffering . . . on someone as a response to her wrongdoing”45 and that
“punishment is incoherent without it being an attempt to inflict
suffering.”46
Is Zaibert right about this? Since the question here is what the
recipient of punishment deserves, perhaps we can start with an analysis
of the general concept of desert. As Joel Feinberg explained in his seminal
discussion, every desert statement has at least three elements.47 In the
statement, “S deserves X in virtue of F,” S is the deserving person, X is
what he deserves, and F is the desert basis—that is, the basis for X.48
To understand how it is that a person deserves something, we must
understand two relationships: the relationship between the person who
43. ZAIBERT, supra note 1, at 3.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 11.
47. Joel Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN
THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 61 (1970).
48. Id.
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is deserving and the desert basis (S and F), and that between what is
deserved and the desert basis (X and F). The person who is deserving and
the desert basis (S and F) are related in that the desert basis has to be
an attribute of the deserving person. In the relationship between what is
deserved and the basis for desert (X and F), the key concept is “fitness”
or appropriateness.49 So, a response to criminal wrongdoing is “fitting” or
“appropriate” only if it takes a form that symbolizes or expresses the
society’s condemnatory attitude towards the criminal conduct. This is
why it would be inappropriate to reward criminals, whereas infliction of
suffering is often seen as an appropriate response. Second, a corollary to
this is that not every form of loss is an acceptable form of punishment in
every society, depending on the symbolic significance the particular form
of loss has in the society.50 For instance, the sanction of “community
service” may appear inappropriate for certain crimes given the mixed
signals—either as a sanction or as evidence of the participant’s
generosity and public spiritedness—such service gives.51
The concept of proportionality in punishment follows from the idea of
fitness.52 In short, the harshness of the punishment should reflect our
level of condemnation or disapproval of the criminal act. A punishment
would be excessive, then, if the degree of condemnation symbolized by
the amount of punishment were too high relative to the criminal’s
blameworthiness. A punishment also would be excessive in situations
where it is imposed on a person who has not committed any acts for which
the kind of condemnatory expression that accompanies criminal sanction
would be appropriate. A corollary to all of this is that the harshness of
the punishment should increase as the appropriate level of condemnation
or disapproval increases, which in turn should increase as the gravity of
the crime increases.53
Fitness in desert has both comparative and noncomparative
aspects.54 To illustrate, in the punishment context, the noncomparative
aspect stands for the view that a person convicted of a given crime should
receive a certain amount of punishment, no matter how other people are
treated, while the comparative aspect focuses on what the punishment
for a given crime is compared to punishments for different crimes of
varying degrees of blameworthiness. For example, if a criminal has been
sentenced to five years in prison for stealing a car, noncomparative desert

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 77–78.
Id. at 114.
Id.
See id. at 78.
Id. at 118.
Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 297, 298 (1974).
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asks whether his deed is serious enough to warrant such a response by
the state, regardless of how the state is treating other car thieves and
criminals of more and less serious crimes. Comparative desert, by
contrast, is about whether the car thief is being treated the same way as
other car thieves and other comparably serious criminals and how his
punishment compares to punishments imposed on those who have
committed more or less serious crimes.
Why do both aspects—comparative and noncomparative—matter?
Noncomparative desert matters in the following way: when we say that
it would be clearly disproportionate to punish parking violation with one
year in prison, that statement would be true even if every parking
violation were treated the same way and more serious crimes were
treated more harshly. In other words, even if a sentencing scheme
generates a series of sentences that are in perfect comparative desert
relationship to one another, it is possible for some or all of those sentences
to be too harsh.
The comparative aspect matters, too, as what one deserves is
sometimes determined in reference to what others deserve. So when the
state punishes, it condemns the behavior it punishes as wrong, and the
degree to which the behavior is condemned is expressed by varying the
amount of punishment. Therefore, how one’s punishment stands in
relation to punishments for other crimes supplies a crucial piece of
information as to how wrong the behavior punished is viewed by the
society. This means that a punishment imposed on a criminal would be
“undeserved” if it is more severe than the punishment imposed on those
who have committed more serious crimes or crimes of the same
seriousness, because the judgment it expresses about the seriousness of
the criminal’s behavior would be inappropriate. For instance, as the
death penalty carries a social meaning as the ultimate punishment for
the most serious crimes, each time the state imposes a death sentence it
shows that it considers the crime at issue to be not only one of the most
serious offenses committed against the society, but also an offense that
is as serious as other crimes that the society considers to be the most
serious. Those who commit offenses less serious than the most serious
offenses and are still sentenced to death would be receiving harsher
sentences than they deserve, because part of what it means for them to
receive the punishment they deserve is that they are punished less
harshly than the worst criminal.
In this way, comparative desert functions the way an audience at a
play responds to various performers at the end of the performance. 55
55. I borrow this example from David Miller. See David Miller, Comparative and
Noncomparative Desert, in DESERT AND JUSTICE 25, 30 (Serena Olsaretti ed., 2003).
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Assuming that a given production is good enough to merit applause, the
audience members vary the length and intensity of their applause to
show their relative levels of appreciation for different members of the
cast. There may be noncomparative desert at work here, because if the
production as a whole is not worthy of applause, no member of the cast
may deserve any showing of appreciation. But barring such a situation,
what determines how the audience greets each member of the cast is the
principle of comparative desert. That is, other things being equal,
generally the cast members with bigger and more difficult parts tend to
receive the longer, louder, and more intense applause. The reason this
has to be so is that there is a limit as to how long, loud, and intense
cheering can get, and the audience has to save their longest applause for
the cast member they appreciate the most. If they are too quick to
unleash their most enthusiastic showing of appreciation and use it on
minor characters, they may not be able to express to the ones with the
leading parts how much more they appreciate them than those with
lesser roles. And if such a situation unfortunately arises, those who
deserve more recognition from the audience would not be receiving what
they deserve, not just what they comparatively deserve. It is in this sense
that what one deserves cannot be determined without considering both
comparative and noncomparative aspects.
Incidentally, it is important to note here that nothing in this account
requires suffering as a response to criminal wrongdoing. According to the
account presented, the important feature of desert is that of a “fitting” or
“appropriate” response. It is true that what is typically considered to be
a “fitting” response to criminal wrongdoing is infliction of suffering, but,
it seems to me, that is not a requirement of this theory of desert. The
right level of condemnation need not be expressed in terms of inflictions
of suffering, as, say, a symbolic response can suffice.
Zaibert would disagree with the position that punishment and
suffering can be decoupled in the way I am suggesting. Perhaps Zaibert
is correct, and let’s grant that he is correct and I am wrong on the issue
of the conceptual connection between punishment and suffering. It still
seems to me that there are good reasons to attempt to reduce the amount
of suffering in our criminal justice system, and to the extent that the state
can find a way to devise a fitting and appropriate response to criminal
wrongdoing without inflicting suffering, that is a goal worthy of our
attention. I worry that Zaibert’s insistence on a “conceptual connection”
between punishment and suffering would have the effect of preventing
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such efforts from taking off, and would be received as an invitation to
complacency and indifference to human suffering inflicted in our name. 56
Now, to be fair, Zaibert is concerned with reducing suffering as well,
as he notes that there is “obvious value in diminishing suffering in the
world” and there is value in forgiveness, which he defines as “sparing
(deserved) suffering.”57 Much of this book is devoted to showing that there
is a “tension between the value of punishment and the value of
forgiveness,” and that in “[m]ost cases, particularly those occurring
within the context of modern criminal justice systems . . . we simply
cannot punish with clean hands.”58 Fully recognizing this point, Zaibert
suggests, would make us “approach the prospect of punishing wrongdoers
(or of setting up primitive institutions) with more sober circumspection
than we have tended to do.”59
Zaibert and I are in agreement, then, that punishment ought to
trouble us because of its real human costs. However, I worry that his talk
of a “conceptual connection between punishment and suffering” would
still tend to make us inured to the existence of suffering in our criminal
justice system while his talk about the value of forgiveness gets ignored. 60
My sympathies are rather with approaches that deemphasize suffering
in accounts of punishment. Zaibert points out, in response to the view
that communication—or expression-focused—theories of punishment are
more humane than a view like his, that “[c]ommunication can cause
suffering, and sometimes brutally and nastily so.”61 That is fair enough
as a way to contribute to a theoretical dispute. However, how we interpret
what we do can push us in different directions in the way we build and
design and operate our institutions, and positing that to punish a person
is to aim make him or her suffer could push us in one direction whereas
positing that one can punish without aiming to make a person suffer
could push us in a different direction.
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